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'Let the jury consider their verdict' the King said...
'No, no!, said the Queen. 'Sentence first-verdict afterwards.'
- Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
The Queen of Hearts's pronouncement on the expendability of trial
before the imposition of penalty may strike some as substantially lacking
in due process, but it nonetheless represents a philosophy that is becoming
an accepted canon of modern american criminal procedure. The cherished
concept of the presumption of innocence and the need for adjudication
before sentence has eroded over the years. Taking its place is a growing
belief that the safety of society depends on massive deprivation of liberty
and property without predetermination of guilt. The notion of innocence
has now become an inconvenient technicality as opposed to a valued
principle.
Such was not always the case. Until the 1970's the presumption of
innocence was "undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its en-
forcement [was]... at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law."' So strong was the presumption, and so per asive was its impact
throughout the criminal justice system, that challf ages to its application
as inimicable with public safety were met with Blackstone's often quoted
phrase, "that it is better that ten guilty persons escape ... than that one
innocent suffer."2
Erosion of this fundamental principle took hold with force in the early
1970s when notions of preventive detention surfaced as part of the Nixon
administration's attempts to control "criminals" before they committed
crimes.' Critics claimed that preventive detention violated the principle
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University. B.A., Franklin & Mar-
shall College, 1971; J.D., Ohio State University, 1974.
'Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1985).
2 4 W. BLAcKSToNE, COMMENTARIES * 358.
3 President Nixon first proposed preventive detention in his first "crime control"
message to Congress in 1969. 27 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 238 (1969). Subsequently, the
White House made the concept of preventive detention a prominent feature of a
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of the presumption of innocence. Supporters responded by claiming that
the principle of presumption of innocence, thought by scholars to be at
the very foundation of law, was "simply a rule of evidence which allows
the defendant to stand mute at trial ... -4
Further erosion of the presumption of innocence was evident by 1979
when Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 5 endorsed
the Mitchell view that the presumption of innocence raised no protectable
interest outside the trial itself.6 As discussed below, it is ironic that in
the years following Wolfish, even the adjudication process ultimately suc-
cumbs to the Queen of Hearts rule.
In 1984, Congress enacted the first federal preventive detention pro-
gram with national application.7 The appropriately titled (in an Orwellian
sense) Bail Reform Act of 1984 paused momentarily to note that
"[n]othing in [the act] shall be construed as modifying or limiting the
presumption of innocence."8 But as Justice Marshall pointed out, "[tihe
very pith and purpose of this statute is an abhorrent limitation of the
presumption of innocence."
In United States v. Salerno, ° Justice Rehnquist divorced the presump-
tion of innocence from considerations of detention. The legacy of this
"law and order" campaign headed by Attorney General John Mitchell. This cam-
paign resulted in the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 231321-1331 (1981). The preventive detention provisions
allowed for individuals charged with certain felonies to be detained for up to sixty
days before trial in order to assure the community's safety. For a full discussion,
see Borman, The Selling of Preventive Detention 1970 65 NW. U.L. REv. 879 (1971).
4 Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA.
L. REV. 1223, 1231 (1969).
5 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
6 Wolfish involved allegations of unconstitutional conditions brought about by
subjecting presumptively innocent pre-trial detainees in Manhattan's Metropol-
itan Correctional Center to inhumane treatment. Id. at 523. The Court refused
to accept the argument that the presumption of innocence required the acceptance
of the Second Circuit's compelling necessity test announced in Detainees of the
Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d. Cir. 1975).
Malcolm had recognized that the presumption of innocence requires that com-
pelling safety reasons must be shown to justify harsh detention conditions and
deprivation of rights.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) provides:
If, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of this
section, the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as re-
quired and the safety of any other person and the community, suchjudicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.
8 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
9 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 762-63 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
10 481 U.S. 739. Chief Justice Rehnquist, having disposed of the presumption
of innocence in Wolfish, does not again refer directly to the presumption. Instead,in Queen of Hearts-like terms, he addresses the issue of whether or not preventive
detention is impermissible punishment without trial (suggesting of course that
there may be permissible punishment without trial). The answer to the question
for the majority is simply to boldly assert that the placing of someone in jailindefinitely, because of a crime for which they have not been convicted, is not
punishment but regulation!
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dismissal of the presumption of innocence is not limited to detention
issues. The presumption has dwindled and nearly disappeared in a wide
range of contexts, including property forfeiture, 1 sex offense/child abuse
prosecution,12 and jury instructions. 13
This article will examine the origin, history, and decline of the pre-
sumption of innocence in three contexts: (1) pretrial detention, (2) prop-
erty forfeiture, and (3) trial stage - courtroom settings and jury
instructions.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
If it suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?
- Emperor Julian
The presumption of innocence has been at the foundation of our judicial
system dating back at least to the Roman empire.
4 In Coffin v. United
States, 5 the United States Supreme Court traced the history of the pre-
sumption from the proclamations of Emperor Julian through its early
applications in American jurisprudence. The French referred to the pre-
sumption of innocence in the French Declaration of Rights of Man and
Citizen of 1789. Fortescue is noted as saying that "[O]ne would much
rather that twenty guilty persons should escape the punishment of death
than that one innocent person should be condemned and suffer capi-
tally.' Lord Hale said "[I]t is better five guilty persons should escape
unpunished than one innocent person should die."'
1 7 Blackstone, quoted
earlier, also compromises on the ratio of nonpunished guilty defendants
to wrongly convicted innocents, at ten.'8
Although the early references discussed the presumption of innocence
in terms of adjudication at the trial stage, there were often inferences
that the values contained therein extended throughout the criminal jus-
tice system. The Court in Coffin intimated that the expounders of the
common law linked the presumption of innocence with concepts of human
liberty and individual rights.19 In perhaps the leading work on the pre-
sumption in the 19th century, Professor Thayer recounted its history. He
noted that early recordings of the concept in this country linked it with
11 See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
12 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); infra notes 101-110 and accompanying
text.
13 Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
14 See A. MARCELLINUS, RERUM GESTARUM, Book 18.
18 156 U.S. 432 (1985).
I6 DELAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE (Amos' translation, Cambridge, 1825).
17 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 289.
18 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2.
19 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 460 (1985).
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the basic notion of the inherent honesty and innocence of man, assumed
to exist until such time as the establishment of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.20 Despite the sources relied on by the Court in Coffin and the
writings of Thayer, there was very little written about the nature of the
presumption or its application outside the context of trial evidence. No
notable expansion of the doctrine received prominent attention until the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Stack v. Boyle.21
In Stack, the Court considered the habeas corpus petition of twelve
persons charged with violations of the Smith Act. High bail ($50,000)
was set solely because of the nature of the alleged, unproven offense. In
granting the petitioners relief, the Court, per Chief Justice Vinson, stated:
"[The] traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unham-
pered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of
punishment prior to conviction .... Unless this right to bail before trial
is preserved, the presumption of innocence secured only after centuries of
struggle, would lose its meaning. '2
ChiefJustice Vinson's pronouncement marked the first significant link-
ing of the presumption of innocence to stages of the pretrial process. 23 In
Hudson v. Parker,24 decided one month before Coffin, the Court stated,
"[A] person accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged
guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo
imprisonment or punishment .... 25 The Stack court relied on the prin-
ciple that there must be a finding of guilt before punishment is imposed.
In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the significance of the presumption of
innocence. It found that the presumption was an expression of the basic
belief in innocence as part of the nature of humankind.
In the years following Stack, courts were quick to reinforce the link
between bail and the presumption of innocence. Indeed, lower courts
extended the rationale of Stack to state criminal procedure. Such actions
were based on the impact of pre-trial incarceration on the presumption
of innocence. The impact was of constitutional significance because it
"[I]n the eye of the law every man is honest and innocent, unless it be proved
legally to the contrary." J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 551, 552 (1898) (quoting RECORDS OF MASS. iii, 434-35 (1657)).21 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
22 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
- The Court was urged to adopt this approach by the petitioners, who relied
on the notion that pre-trial incarceration was in effect punishment without con-
viction if based on any factor other than the guaranteeing of the defendant's
reappearance. Thus the petitioners stated: "The purpose of the allowance of bailis to prevent the punishment of innocent persons as well as to secure the presence
of the persons charged with trial at their trial." Petition For Writ Of CertiorariTo The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit at 7, Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). This bonding of the presumption of innocence to any
punishment raises the central issue posed by the Queen of Hearts herself.
156 U.S. 277 (1895).
25Id. at 285.
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raised issues of basic due process, as well as the unresolved question of
the application of the eighth amendment to the states.
2
With few exceptions, the Supreme Court remained silent following
Stack regarding the extent of the application of the presumption to mat-
ters outside the adjudication stage of the criminal process.2 7 Lower courts,
however, applied the Stack principles in a variety of contexts.
28
Applications of the presumption of innocence to preadjudication stages
were consistent with then-emerging analyses of the criminal process.
Most notable among them is Professor Herbert Packer's 1968 study of
the criminal justice system.29 Professor Packer postulates that the ele-
21 In Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1155 (8th Cir. 1981), the court reviewed the
petitioner's habeas corpus and civil action challenging Nebraska's refusal to admit
to bail defendants charged with sexual assault. Although the United States Su-
preme Court has never resolved the issue of whether the excessive bail clause of
the eighth amendment was applicable to the states through fourteenth amend-
ment incorporation, the Hunt court found that the interests reflected by bail were
part of an ordered scheme of liberty and as such were fundamental to the American
scheme of justice (in fact practically all courts have concluded that the excessive
bail provision is applicable to the states for the same reason). Significantly, how-
ever, the court goes beyond mere incorporation to state: "The protection against
excessive bail has a direct nexus to the presumption of innocence, implicitly
recognized within the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).
27 Justice Brennan, in a series of cases, has advocated over the years the rec-
ognition of the presumption of innocence as an important part of our criminal
justice process outside the actual trial itself. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963), Justice Brennan in his dissent disagreed with the majority's recognition
of "noknock" entries as reasonable under the fourth amendment and in so doing
stated:
The excuse for failing to knock to announce the officer's mission where
the occupants are oblivious to his presence can only be an automatic
assumption that the suspect within will resist the officer's attempt to
enter peacefully, or will frustrate the arrest .... Such assumptions
do obvious violence to the presumption of innocence.
Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
In Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), Justice Brennan, this time concurring,
concluded that "the evils at which the clause [speedy trial clause of the sixth
amendment] is directed are readily identified. It is intended to spare an accused
those penalties and disabilities - incompatible with the presumption of innocence
- that may spring from delay in the criminal process." Id. at 41 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), Justice Brennan again took arms against
punishment without verdict in his dissent. Paul involved the practice of Kentucky
police chiefs circulating to merchants flyers containing the names of individuals
suspected of shoplifting. Brennan noted:
It is hard to conceive of a more devastating flouting of the presumption
of innocence, that "bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle
whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law'"
Id. at 725 n.12 (citations omitted).
28Lower courts considering the application of Stack have generally assumed
that the "excessive bail" language meets the "part of an ordered scheme of liberty"
test for selective incorporation. See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1155 (8th Cir.
1981).
H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
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ments of the criminal justice system and its potential for change can best
be understood by studying two models; the Due Process Model and the
Crime Control Model. Each of these models is "an attempt to give oper-
ational content to a complex of values underlying the criminal law."30
Packer's Due Process Model rests on a set of values which reflect an
assessment of the "efficacy of crime control devices. '31 They also reflect
a realistic appraisal of the reliability of fact determinations of guilt
throughout the process. The Due Process Model rejects the premise that
accurate fact finding for purposes of protecting the innocent from un-
warranted criminal justice involvement can be left to investigative and
prosecutorial officials. Instead, the Model "substitutes for [this premise]
a view of informal, nonadjudicative factfinding that stresses the possi-
bility of error. '32 Because of the possibility of error from investigations
conducted by persons with no interest in protecting the interests of the
accused, the Due Process Model leads to "a rejection of informal fact-
finding processes as definitive of factual guilt and to an insistence on
formal, adjudicative, adversary fact-finding processes in which the factual
case against the accused is ... evaluated only after the accused has had
a full opportunity to discredit the case against him."33 Implicitly, the Due
Process Model recognizes that fact finding prior to, and apart from the
adjudication of guilt is a necessary part of the system.
The Crime Control Model, on the other hand, rests on "the proposition
that the repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important
function to be performed by the criminal process. ' 3 4 The Model's emphasis
on control necessitates the use of mechanisms designed to dragnet po-
tential offenders and to introduce sanctions that serve public protection
interests without any fastidious concerns over accuracy or false posi-
tives.3 -
In Packer's Due Process Model, the presumption of innocence serves
as a bulwark against the imposition of any punishment oriented restric-
tions in the absence of the establishment of legal guilt (as opposed to
factual guilt).36 The Crime Control Model rejects the presumption of in-
30 Id. at 154.
31 Id. at 163.
32 Id.
13Id. at 163-64.
SId. at 158.
Packer states: "The model in order to operate successfully, must produce a
high rate of apprehension and conviction, and must do so in a context where the
magnitudes being dealt with are very large and the resources for dealing with
them are very limited." Id. at 159.
36 By forcing the state to prove its case against the accused in an adjudicative
context, the presumption of innocence serves to force into play all the qualifying
and disabling doctrines that limit the use of the criminal sanction against the
individual, thereby enhancing his opportunity to secure a favorable outcome. In
this sense, the presumption of innocence may be seen to operate as a kind of self-
fulfilling prophecy. By opening up a procedural situation that permits the suc-
cessful assertion of defenses having nothing to do with factual guilt, it vindicates
the proposition that the factually guilty may nonetheless be legally innocent and
should therefore be given a chance to qualify for that kind of treatment. Id. at
167.
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nocence as a limitation upon the preadjudication stages. Instead it relies
on the initial police and prosecutorial screening as an accurate indicator
of probable and actual guilt. By doing so, it allows for the "presumption
of [actual] guilt 3 7 for all who are formally charged.
In 1968, the criminal process deck was stacked in favor of a rapidly
growing Due Process Model.3" This growth was a direct result of the
constitutional revolution characterized by the United States Supreme
Court's shaping of state as well as federal criminal procedure.3 9 As pointed
out by Packer, this reliance on judicial edicts for change was also one of
the Model's greatest weaknesses. 40 Despite the inherent threats to the
continuance of the Due Process Method foreseen by Packer, optimism
remained high that the Due Process Model, with its reliance on the prin-
ciple of presumptive innocence, would continue to grow and replace the
concepts of the Crime Control Model.
41
How then did the presumption of innocence fall from its high pedestal
to its lowly status as a mere evidentiary principle? Some understanding
of this may be had by examining the rise of the Queen of Hearts rule, in
the post-Due Process Model era.
H. Loss OF LIBERTY/LOSS OF INNOCENCE
[Ojur fundamental principles ofjustice declare that the defend-
ant is as innocent on the day before his trial as he is on the
morning after his acquittal.
- Justice Thurgood Marshall
42
37 "Once a man has been arrested and investigated without being found to be
probably innocent, or, to put it differently, once a determination has been made
that there is enough evidence of guilt to permit holding him for further action,
then all subsequent activity directed toward him is based on the view that he is
probably guilty." Id. at 160.
Id. at 239.
3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
" Professor Packer prophetically states:
Changes in attitude toward the criminal process or changes in person-
nel on the Court (which may come to the same thing) can slow or
reverse the trend in two ways. First and more obviously, decisions can
be overruled.... A second, subtler, and probably more serious, threat
to the continued strengthening of the Due Process trend is that the
justices will, out of diminished enthusiasm either for the principles
involved or for the continued combat their vindication entails, cease
or slacken their scrutiny of the criminal process as it operates in both
state and federal criminal courts.
Id. at 240.
41 Id. at 243. Packer foresaw that the due process renaissance would produce
a "generation of scholars uniquely knowledgeable about and alert to the problems
of the criminal process." He suggested that the persuasive value of their opinions
could overcome the crime control pressures generated by the Queen of Hearts
philosophy. Id.
41 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 764 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also infra note 68.
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Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were indicted on charges of mail
and wire fraud, extortion, criminal gambling, and RICO violations.43 They
were arrested on March 21, 1986, and despite the fact that they had not
been convicted on these charges, the government moved to have the de-
fendants detained under the preventive detention provisions of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984,44 alleging that they were a danger to the community
and that no release conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the
community.
The evidence against the defendants at their detention hearing con-
sisted primarily of conversations intercepted by a court-ordered wiretap,
allegedly supporting the contention, supposedly reserved for trial on the
indictments, that Salerno was a mafia boss, that Cafaro was his "captain,"
and that the two were engaged in a conspiracy of extortion and murder.45
The District Court granted the detention order, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court.46
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court dealt the death hand to the
notion of a pretrial presumption of innocence. 47 Salerno presented a facial
attack upon the constitutionality of the preventive detention provisions.
The defendants alleged that the provisions for preventive detention were
a violation of both substantive due process and the eighth amendment's
excessive bail clause.4
The majority viewed the defendants' argument regarding substantive
due process as one which essentially claimed that the provision authorizes
"impermissible punishment before trial.."49 Separating this claim from
any relationship to the eighth amendment claim, the majority concluded
that the total deprivation of liberty allowed by preventive detention was
"regulatory" in nature and not punishment at all.50
481 U.S. at 743.
"18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1988)).
"United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743 (1987).
"United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
,7 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
- The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
"9481 U.S. at 746.
10 Rehnquist states:
[Tihe mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment. To de-
termine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible pun-
ishment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent.
Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions,
the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on "whether an alternative
purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is as-
signable to it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned [to it]."
Id. at 746-47 (citations omitted).
The Salerno Court's quote above is from Schnall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 269 (1984)(quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). The Salerno
Court apparently ignored the more extensive test stated in Kennedy for deter-
mining punishment:
[Vol. 37:3
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While it might seem like a sleight of hand trick to explain that the
jailing of an individual because of danger proven by wrongful conduct is
anything but punishment, the majority nonetheless delegates the decision
to the will of Congress.5 1 Having declared that preventive detention is
mere regulation, the Court moves on to find that such regulation is not
excessive in relation to its purpose. The majority likewise disposes of the
defendants' claim that the denial of bail is a violation of the eighth amend-
ment.'
2
What the majority fails to mention is perhaps the most significant
aspect of its decision - the impact on the presumption of innocence.
Marshall, in vigorous dissent, states:
The essence of this case may be found, ironically enough, in a
provision of the Act to which the majority does not refer. Title
18 § U.S.C. 3142(j) (1982 ed., Supp. III) provides that "[n]othing
in this section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the
presumption of innocence." But the pith and purpose of this
statute is an abhorrent limitation of the presumption of in-
nocence.
53
The Rehnquist view ignores the essential point that both due process
and the bail clause serve to protect "the invaluable guarantee afforded
by the presumption of innocence."' As noted by Marshall, the sanctions
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry,
and may often point in differing directions.
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (emphasis in original).
51 The problem with the Court's analysis is pointed out by Marshall in dissent:
The majority proceeds as though the only substantive right protected
by the Due Process Clause is a right to be free from punishment before
conviction. The majority's technique for infringing this right is simple:
merely redefine any measure which is claimed to be punishment as
"regulation," and, magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its
imposition.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52 The Court rejects the notion advanced since Stack that the reference to
excessive bail presupposes an initial right to bail, or that pretrial release may
not consider detention for reasons of future dangerousness. Relying on its earlier
opinion in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), the Court concludes that
"nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible government consider-
ations solely to questions of flight." 481 U.S. at 754.
53 Id. at 762-63.
5 Id. at 763.
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of preventive detention are not imposed on all who are dangerous, but
only on those who are criminally charged. Thus it is the imprimatur of
guilt flowing from the yet unproven indictment that is the trigger for
detention. Why wait for trial when we can begin incarceration now?
The result in Salerno was not unforeshadowed. The groundwork for its
disregard for the presumption of innocence is laid not only by Wolfish but
also by a lower court case interpreting the earlier preventive detention
provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control Act enacted for use in the
District of Columbia. 55
Nor was the rush to curtail liberty without conviction limited to cases
of criminal prosecution. In Schall v. Martin,56 relied on by the Court in
Salerno, Rehnquist, writing for the majority, ignored the presumption of
innocence implications of preventive detention of alleged juvenile delin-
quents.5 7 Instead, Rehnquist viewed the issue as a balancing between
legitimate interests of the state and what the Court determined to be the
reduced liberty interest of juveniles. 58
The legacy of Salerno/Sehall is a total reordering not only of our concept
of the significance of liberty, but also of our commitment to the importance
of innocence. Blackstone's admonition "that it is better that ten guilty
persons escape ... than that one innocent suffer"59 is replaced by the
inverse adage that "it is better that ten innocent persons suffer, than that
one guilty person escape."'60
15 Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (App. D.C. 1974), upheld D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-1322 (1973) against a challenge based, inter alia, on the claim thatdetaining a person without bail abridges the presumption of innocence. The courtjoined detention based on danger implied by the unproven charge in with otherpretrial conditions to find no particular pretrial infringement of the presumption.
467 U.S. 253 (1984).
Delinquency refers, generally, to the commission of an offense that wouldbe a crime if committed by an adult. In Schall, the juvenile was charged withdelinquent acts that if charged against an adult would constitute first-degree
robbery, second degree robbery, and criminal possession of a weapon. The juvenile
was held for a total of fifteen days prior to adjudication because of the "danger"presented by the juvenile, as evidenced, inter alia, by the allegations in the
complaints.
r' Rehnquist postulates that juveniles have a different liberty interest than
adults. He states: "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.
... Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of
themselves." 467 U.S. at 265 (citations omitted).But note that the Court had earlier determined that even a limited libertyinterest was entitled to due process protection. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972).
" See supra note 2.
60 Professor Packer's Crime Control Model, supra notes 34-37 and accompa-
nying text, would certainly accept this notion as representative of a fair price to
be paid for increased apprehension of criminals.
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The acolytes of this new credo respond to their critics with claims that
the presumption of innocence has no place in what is purported to be a
regulatory scheme not based on punishment. Such a view, in the context
of detention, ignores the real nature of detention - be it jail or a juvenile
detention center.
The very nature of jail/detention bespeaks punishment. Despite the
illusory promise of the presumption of innocence,6 1 the pre-trial detainee
is subjected to "punishment" on the same order as any convicted felon.
6 2
Certainly such conditions would fit within the definition of punishment
stated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.6 But more importantly, the na-
ture of jail as a place of pre-trial confinement was, until Salerno/Schall,
traditionally accorded special status because of its intertwined relation-
ship with the presumption of innocence.6
61 The premise of the presumption, now forgotten by the rule of the Queen of
Hearts, as it pertained to those awaiting trial, was stated by Blackstone:
Upon the whole, if the offense be not bailable, or the party cannot find
bail, he is to be committed to the county jail by the mittimus of the
justice, or warrant under his hand and seal, containing the cause of
his commitment; there to abide till delivered by due course of law. But
this imprisonment, as has been said, is only for safe custody, and not
for punishment; therefore, in this dubious interval between commit-
ment and trial, a prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity
62 It is probably true that persons who have not yet been convicted of a crime
are subjected to the worst aspects of the American correctional system. Uncon-
victed persons, as yet legally innocent, are almost invariably subjected to the
tightest security ....
This primary concern for security imposes regimentation, repeated
searches, and close surveillance on detainees.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections 24 (1967).
In Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass
1973), the court quotes the Final Report of the 42nd American Assembly (1972):
"Local jails are even worse than prisons .... In them standards of humanity and
decency are violated, and the presumption of innocence which is so basic to Amer-
ican justice is ignored." 360 F. Supp. at 684.
The grim truth of our system of pre-trial detention is graphically described by
the court in Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971):
confinement in cramped and overcrowded quarters, lightless, airless,
damp and filthy with leaking water and human wastes, slow star-
vation, deprivation of most human contacts, except with others in the
same sub-human state, no exercise or recreation, little if any medical
attention, no attempt at rehabilitation, and for those who in despair
or frustration lash out at their surroundings, confinement, stripped
of clothing and every last vestige of humanity, in a sort of oubliette
Id. at 99.
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
" See Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974); McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 273 (1973).
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Like the Queen of Hearts, concerns over expediency and fear of crime
have now reordered the Court's perception of liberty and the presumption
of innocence. But the legacy of the Queen's reign is not limited to jail
now, trial later. The hand dealt by the logical extension of the decline of
the significance of the presumption of innocence now extends to loss of
property as well as liberty.
III. Loss OF INNOCENCE/LOSS OF PROPERTY
If[the defendant] has no money to buy food or to pay for housing,
he might waive his right to release on bail and go to jail, but
he still could not employ counsel and his family would remain
stripped of all means of support-without even the option of
reporting to jail-though accused of no crime. That the merefact ofan indictment accompanied by the affidavit of a prosecutor
can accomplish these results should shock the judicial consci-
ence at least as much as does the assertion that the prosecution
may pump the stomach of an accused person in order to obtain
evidence.
- Judge Alvin B. Rubin65
The United States Constitution guarantees that no person may be de-
prived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law The tra-
ditional notion that the presumption of innocence served to insure that
liberty would not be lost without due process also extended to loss of
property. Thus, at common law a defendant did not face loss or restriction
on use of his property, because of criminal wrongdoing, until after con-
viction.6
7
The reordering of our principles relating to the presumption of inno-
cence, brought about by the Schall/Salerno doctrine, have not been limited
to liberty. The concern for more effective law enforcement, coupled with
the frustration over the shortcomings in the "war on drugs,' 6 has resulted
65United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1474 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., con-
curring).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
67 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 380-85. Although the law of deodand
allowed for the confiscation of property demonstrated to be the instrument of a
man's death, regardless of whether the owner had been convicted of the killing.O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 73 (M.Howe ed. 1963). See generally Brickey,Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the
Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REv. 493 (1986).
Professor Wisotsky comments:In his original declaration of War on Drugs, President Reagan an-
[Vol. 37:3
THE REIGN OF THE QUEEN OF HEARTS
in the adoption of procedures for the wholesale seizing and freezing of
assets and property belonging to those accused, as well as convicted of
crime. 9
Forfeiture of property is relatively new to the American criminal proc-
ess.70 In 1970 Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (hereinafter RICO) 71 which included provisions for the
seizure of property of those indicted and convicted of "pattern of rack-
eteering activity" 72 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute
(hereinafter CCE)73 which included property forfeiture provisions for vir-
tually any federal drug offense. 74 Forfeiture covered all property, profits,
or assets derived directly or indirectly from the illegal enterprise.7 5 De-
spite the breadth of the language, initial seizures under these provisions
nounced a "legislative offensive designed to win approval of reforms"
with respect to bail, sentencing, criminal forfeiture, and the exclu-
sionary rule. He succeeded in almost respect. The Administration's
march toward a tougher set of investigative and prosecutorial powers
drew much of its energy from the widespread belief that the criminal
justice system was treating drug traffickers with excessive leniency.
Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights 38
HASTINGs L.J. 889, 895 (1987).
8 The notion of prejudgment forfeiture in general is not new. In a civil case,
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court approved of a procedure for the
prejudgment seizure of property where the magistrate permitting the seizure
made a review of the application and determined that there was probable cause
to believe that the asset would be disposed of if not seized. This process differs
significantly from that provided for by the RICO and CCE forfeiture procedures
discussed infra at notes 71-74 and accompanying text, in that the criminal for-
feiture and restraining order processes may be maintained solely on the existence
of the indictment without conviction.
70 Prior to 1970, forfeiture was not a significant feature of the criminal process.
But see Confiscation Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 589 (1862), repealed by, Act of March
4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1153 (providing for the seizure of confederate property).
71 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
72 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). "Pattern of racketeering activity" is defined as
"at least two acts of racketeering activity [as defined by 18 § U.S.C. 1961(1) (1988)]
one of which occurred after the effective date [of RICO] and the last of which
occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity." 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) (1988).
73 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1982).
74 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1982).
71 RICO provides for forfeiture of:
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962;
(2) any -
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over; any enterprise which the person has established,
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of,
in violation of section 1962; and
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were few and the effect was thought to be insubstantial.7 6 The inconven-
ience of trial and the presumption of innocence posed a frustrating barrier
to law enforcement. An alternative to post conviction property seizure
was desperately sought, and an answer was found in The Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984 (hereinafter CFA). 77
The essence of property ownership is the ability to use it. If the ability
of a defendant to use his or her assets is restricted or denied, then the
difference between outright seizure and such restrictions becomes prac-
tically non-existent. Such are the effects of the CFA. The Act expanded
the power of federal courts to enter temporary restraining orders both
before and after indictment.78 Thus, without conviction, the defendant
faces the prospect of loss of effective use of property based solely on the
existence of unproven charges, or in the case of 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (d)(1)(B),
without even the courtesy of a formal charge.
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, form racketeering activity or
unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
CCE similarly provides:
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter... shall forfeit
to the United States irrespective of any provision of State law -
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such vio-
lation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such
violation ....
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (Supp. V 1987).
76 Congressional concern was expressed as follows:
Unlike civil forfeitures, in which the government's seizure of the asset
occurs at or soon after the commencement of the forfeiture action, in
criminal forfeitures, the assets generally remain in the custody of the
defendant until the time of his conviction .... Thus, a person who
anticipates that some of his property may be subject to criminal for-
feiture has not only an obvious incentive, but also ample opportunity,
to transfer his assets or remove them from the jurisdiction of the court
prior to trial and so shield them from any possibility of forfeiture.
Currently, the only mechanism available to the government to pre-
vent such actions is the authority to obtain a restraining order and
this statutory authority is limited to the post-indictment period. Thus,
even if the government is aware that a person is disposing of his prop-
erty in anticipation of the filing of criminal charges.., it has no specific
authority under the RICO or CCE statutes to obtain an appropriate
protective order. Furthermore, even if the government is able to obtain
a restraining order, should the defendant choose to defy it, he can
effectively prevent the forfeiture of his property and face only the
possibility of contempt sanctions for his defiance of the court's order.
The important economic impact of imposing the sanction of forfeiture
against the defendant is thus lost.
Report No. 98-225 at 195-96
7 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040-57 (1970).
78 CFA added the following provisions to RICO:
Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restrain-
ing order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory perfor-
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While supporters of seizure before conviction might suggest that pre-
judgment forfeiture has some precedent, '79 that does not explain the aban-
donment of the presumption of innocence in a criminal prosecution where
guilt is implied, for forfeiture purposes, solely from the indictment. Yet
in two recent cases, the United States Supreme Court did indeed abandon
the presumption once again; this time without so much as an acknowl-
edgement of its existence. 0
In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court faced the issue of whether in a pros-
ecution under CCE, a defendant may be prohibited from using funds
earmarked for forfeiture to pay attorney fees.8' Defendant argued, un-
successfully, that such funds were exempt from the act or, if they were
not, that his sixth amendment right to counsel was undermined.
In Monsanto also, the defendant faced prosecution under CCE. Like the
defendant in Caplin & Drysdale, Monsanto was subject to a restraining
order prohibiting him from using funds for counsel, among other things.
Monsanto sought an order unfreezing assets for counsel use only.
2
mance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of
property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under this section -
(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter and alleging that the property with
respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction,
be subject to forfeiture under this section; or
(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if after
notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and
opportunity for a hearing the court determines that -
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will
prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order
will result in the property being destroyed, removed from the ju-
risdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture;
and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through
the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any
party against whom the order is entered;
18 U.S.C. 1963(d)(1) (1988). CFA added identical language to CCE 21 U.S.C. Sec.
853(e) (Supp. V. 1987).
,9 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding that prejudgment seizure
of property was authorized where a hearing was held by a magistrate and a
determination was made that the property would be disposed of prior to judgment
if not seized).
'o Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2646
(1989); United States v. Monsanto, __ U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
8, The devastating impact of these provisions has been perhaps most evident
in their use to freeze and effectively dispose of the defendant's funds otherwise
available for attorney fees. This issue is beyond the scope of this article. For a
discussion of the issue, see Blakey, Forfeiture of Legal Fees: Who Stands to Lose?,
36 EMORY L.J. 781 (1987); Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: On Defining
What" and "When" and Distinguishing "Ought" form "Is", 36 EMORY L.J. 761
(1987).
82 The Court, in its opinions, found that the plain meaning of the Act did not
exempt or allow for the exemption of attorney fees from restrained funds. Ad-
ditionally the Court found that once probable cause of likely conviction has been
demonstrated, the trial court is without power to "unfreeze" funds for counsel
use. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
1989]
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
In neither case did the Court mention the impact of the presumption
of innocence on the question of pre-trial restraint of property. However
the impact of the Court's conclusions is significant. The defendant, in
essence, loses the ability to use his property because of the unproven-by-
trial conclusion of probable guilt.
While the Supreme Court was reluctant to speak specifically about the
presumption of innocence, several lower courts have not been so reticent.
In In Re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale,83 the defendants
challenged, inter alia,8 pretrial forfeiture of property. The defendant theo-
rized that the presumption of innocence forbade such interference. Faced
squarely with the issue, the Fourth Circuit rejected the recognition of
the presumption as having a limiting effect on pretrial forfeiture, and
instead opted for the Salerno/Schall (i.e. Rehnquist) view that "the pre-
sumption of innocence is of undoubted importance in assigning the burden
of proof at trial, but ... is not a grant of immunity from pretrial incon-
venience."85 Similarly, the Third Circuit in United States v. Long,8 6 (de-
cided prior to the 1984 amendments) refused to recognize that the
presumption of innocence had any application to pretrial forfeiture.8 7
If the presumption of innocence does not protect liberty or property
prior to conviction, then when and what does the presumption protect?
The Rehnquist court has relegated the presumption to the role of an
evidentiary rule that springs into existence only at the adjudication. Even
here, however, the Queen of Hearts is not silent.
IV. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND ADJUDICATION OF GUILT
[Tihe presumption of innocence "is a basic component of a fair
trial... And a fair trial, after all, is what the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment above all else guarantees.
- Justice Potter Stewartm
91837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988).
The defendants also challenged the application of the Comprehensive For-
feiture Act of 1984 to funds which the defendant sought to use for payment of
attorney fees.
In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 643 (4th
Cir. 1988). The court's analysis of the restriction on use of assets (including in
this case for the payment of attorney's fee for trial) is reminiscent of the Salerno
notion that detention without bail is merely a "regulation" and not an imper-
missible loss of liberty.
654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.. 1981).
7 The court states: "An order restraining the transfer of property, that may
be subject to forfeiture, does not taint a defendant's presumption of innocence in
violation of the Constitution." Long, 654 F. Supp. at 916 n.8 (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1970)).
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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In the wake of Salerno/Schall, the role of the presumption of innocence
is as uncertain at trial as it is at any pretrial stage. Nowhere is this more
evident than where the court must determine the impact of the courtroom
setting on the jury.
In Estelle v. Williams,89 the Court concerned itself with the impact of
requiring prison dress at trial. 90 The Court responded in the traditional
manner by taking a Due Process Model view of the presumption of in-
nocence. As such, the Court suggests that the presumption was an integral
part of the right to a fair trial.91 The Court recognizes that factors such
as prison dress and appearance were pretrial circumstances which might
adversely affect the fact-finding process.9
In finding that the practice of allowing the jury to view the defendant
while the latter was in prison clothes violated the due process concept of
the presumption of innocence, the Court held that due process required
that an essential state purpose must exist in order to justify a suggestive
courtroom setting. Implicit in the Court's finding is acceptance of the idea
that the presumption of innocence, even at trial, may be limited. Such a
suggestion leaves open the door for the entry of the Queen of Hearts
principle.9
3
In 1986, the Court made use of this opening in Holbrook v. Flynn,94 by
upholding a conviction where the defendant was tried while four uni-
formed troopers sat guard conspicuously behind him. In so doing, the
court stated that: "[w]henever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as
inherently prejudicial... the question must be whether 'an unacceptable
risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.' 95 The un-
certainty surrounding when an "unacceptable risk" exists creates a slip-
pery slope down which it is easy to slide into a quagmire of suggestive
courtroom setups that, while arguably meeting important governmental
interests, directly and indirectly suggest guilt before trial.
- 425 U.S. 501 (1975).
90 The defendant's appearance at trial in prison garb was the result of pretrial
detention and his inability to post bond. This classic example of the effect of
pretrial detention on adjudication raises significant questions concerning the
accuracy of the Rehnquist view that pretrial detention raises only issues of reg-
ulation and does not involve trial rights. See also Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209
(9th Cir. 1970).
9 'The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution,
is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." Estelle,
425 U.S. at 503.
92 "To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may
undermine the fairness of the fact finding process. In the administration ofjustice,
courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be
established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
93 Earlier, in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Court recognized that
where the defendant, through his own contumacious actions, creates the need for
courtroom officers to shackle and gag him, due process is not offended because of
the essential state interest and responsibility to assure a fair and orderly trial.
4 475 U.S. 560 (1986).9 1 Id. at 570.
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Such is the problem created, in particular, by the rash of child witness
protection provisions recently enacted in many jurisdictions. Within re-
cent years, forces for effective law enforcement have aligned with child
protection interests to focus on more efficient (i.e. producing a greater
rate of conviction) methods of bringing to trial those charged with child
abuse and/or sexual assault on children. This attention comes in the wake
of the recognition of the alarming rate of sexual abuse of children in
particular.96
Contemporaneous with the desire for more convictions is the greater
acceptance of the notion that the participation of the child in a criminal
prosecution presents an issue of "special vulnerability [for] very young
children who, as both victims of crime and witnesses in the judicial proc-
ess, face a double ordeal. '97 Faced with this "trauma induced by [the
child's] involvement in the legal system,"9 nationwide legislative enact-
ments and proposals have come into being designed to shield the child
from courtroom trauma stemming from both being present in a courtroom
and from being in the presence of the defendant. 9
96 In 1975 it was estimated that at least 100,000 children were sexually abused
annually. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL
JUVENILE JUSTICE ASSESSMENT CENTERS: A PRELIMINARY NATIONAL ASSESSMENT
OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (1980).
97 NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION,
preface to PROTECTING CHILD VICTIMIWITNESSES (1986).
Id.
By 1985 a majority of the states had passed new laws or amended old pro-
visions to allow for protection of child witnesses in sexual abuse cases. See 5 ABA
Juv. & CHILD WELFARE L. REP., No. 2, 27 (1986). The legislative enactments
attempted so far fall generally into the following categories:
A. Statutes Permitting The Use of Child Out of Court Statements
Examples:
Kansas - KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.460(dd)
(1983)
Washington - WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44:120 (1985)
See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985); State v. Ryan,
103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
B. Videotaped Depositions and Close-Circuit Television
Examples:
California - CAL. PENAL CODE § .1347 (West 1989)
New York - N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. § 65.00 to 65.30 (McKinney 1988)
Ohio - OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Baldwin 1988)
See State v. Vess, 157 Ariz. 236, 756 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1988); State
v. Bass, 221 N.J. Super. 466, 535 A.2d 1 (1987); Miller v. State, 517
N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1987).
C. Modification of Rules Pertaining to Child Competency
Examples:
Iowa - IOWA R. Evin. 601 (Child presumed competent)
Missouri - Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(2) (Vernon 1985) (child com-
petent without prior qualification)
Tennessee - TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-101 (1988) (child victim of
sexual offense is competent witness)
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While these "protections" have generated numerous challenges, 00 sel-
dom have courts considered the effect of such measures on the presump-
tion of innocence. The Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to do so
recently in Coy v. Iowa.10 1
In Coy, the defendant was convicted of lascivious acts with a child, after
a jury trial in which, pursuant to Iowa law,102 a screen ° 3 was placed
between the defendant and the two children who were complaining wit-
nesses. The defendant objected and strenuously argued that his sixth
amendment right to a face-to-face confrontation with his accusers was
denied. The defendant also argued that his due process right to a fair
trial was denied because his presumption of innocence was adversely
affected by the suggestion to the jury that he was dangerous to the chil-
dren and therefore probably guilty.
In a 6-2 decision,1 0 4 the Court concluded that the Iowa procedure vio-
lated the traditional notion of confrontation. °0 However, the Court ducked
the question of whether the equally traditional presumption of innocence
was also diminished. The Court found that it was unnecessary to reach
that issue. 06
By refusing to resolve this issue, the Court avoided the problem of
having to reconcile its pronouncements in Estelle with the limiting no-
- The challenges to the child protection provisions have largely centered
around evidentiary rules against the admission of hearsay and the sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation. Thus courts have voided convictions in cases where
a child's out of court utterance did not fall within the traditional hearsay excep-
tions; see Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 536 A.2d 666 (1988), cert. denied, 312
Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965; People v. Sexton, 162 111. App.3d 607, 515 N.E.2d 1359
(1987); State v. Hudnell, 293 S.C. 97, 359 S.E.2d 59 (1987); and even prior to Coy
v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), have held that the sixth amendment right to face-
toface confrontation of an accuser prohibited the use of videotape, depositions,
and screens between child and defendant, without at least some showing that
such devices are necessary in the particular case. See State v. Vess, 157 Ariz. 236,
756 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Lindner, 142 Wis. 2d 783, 419 N.W.2d 352
(Ct. App. 1987).
10M 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
1o IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987).
,o1 The device was described as "a frame with a substance on it which makes
it possible for the defendant to see the witness but the witness does not see the
defendant." (Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement p.4). The apparent purpose of
the screen was to make the complaining witnesses "feel less uneasy in giving
their testimony." 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2799. However, in order for the
device to work, the courtroom lights had to be dimmed and bright lights had to
be "focused directly on the structure." (Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement p.4 ),
causing the trial judge to note that "[tlhe thing does cause sort of a dramatic
emphasis .... Id.
,o4Kennedy took no part in the decision. O'Connor and White concurred with
the finding that the confrontation clause was violated but noted that in their view
such rights were not absolute. 487 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (O'Conner, J.,
concurring). Interestingly, the Chief Justice and Blackmun dissented after con-
cluding that neither the confrontation clause or the due process clause was vio-
lated.1
D5 Id.
106 Id.
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tions of Salerno/Schall. Additionally, the Court did not have to decide the
difficult question of whether the presumption of innocence, even if rec-
ognized as applicable to the trial setting, could be balanced and perhaps
diminished by perceived necessity or state interest.
The parties framed the issue as one of determining whether the pro-
cedure in question was inherently prejudicial, relying on the Court's
position in Holbrook. Implied in this position is the notion that a violation
of the presumption of innocence at trial creates inherent prejudice offen-
sive to the due process notion of fair trial. Inherent prejudice is defined
as anything likely to compromise the defendant's constitutional right "to
have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment,
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.' 10 7
In this context the appellant asserted that the Iowa procedure "[l]ike
Hester Prynnes's scarlet "A" . . . was a constant reminder that appellant
was accused and presumed guilty of a loathsome crime."'1 8 Given this
inherent prejudice, the question properly might be raised whether any
"essential need" could ever balance the diminution of the presumption of
innocence consistent with due process. Interestingly, the appellant, re-
lying on Holbrook, was willing to accept the notion that diminution of
the presumption could be balanced by essential need,' °9 but maintained
that such was not shown in Coy.110
Without resolution of this question, the rule of the Queen of Hearts is
unlimited. If essential need can reduce the presumption of innocence in
the instance of child witnesses, could not essential need also be shown
for protecting a wide range of potential witness/victims "at risk," such as
adult women, the elderly, or victims of physical violence? Indeed, is there
any category of victims that would not justify the diminishing of the
presumption of innocence in favor of the protection of the victim (or in
fact society) from further harm (all without conviction)?
The suggestion that such questions do not raise significant presumption
of innocence issues is not particularly shocking if it is realized that the
death of the presumption of innocence at the trial itself was already
foretold ten years earlier.
107 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky,
436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)).
108 Appellant's Brief, p. 16.
109 Id.
110 The existence of trial trauma for all child witnesses is disputed as a gen-
eralized matter. See Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 161 Cal.
App. 3d 777 (1984). See also Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and
Emerging Limitations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 167, 174-75 (1985); D. Runyan, Impact
of Legal Intervention on Sexually Abused Children (paper presented to National
Family Violence Research Symposium (July 7, 1987)).
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In Kentucky v. Whorton,11 1 the Court in 1978 considered whether the
jury need, as a matter of constitutional law, be told that the presumption
of innocence existed.1 1 2 Despite the apparent direction of Taylor, decided
just twelve months earlier, the Court in Whorton declared that the failure
to give an instruction to the jury on the presumption of innocence was
just one factor to be considered in the overall totality of the circumstances,
and that "the failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption
of innocence does not in and of itself violate the Constitution."' 3
The presumption of innocence has certainly traveled a long road from
the proclamation of Coffin that the presumption is "undoubted law" the
enforcement of which "lies at the foundation" of our criminal law, to
Whorton's relegation of the presumption to constitutional insignificance.
It may be a longer road yet to understand what, if anything, the pre-
sumption means on the day of trial.114
The unanswered question in Coy is just a glimpse into the future. It is
but one example of issues within the trial process itself that give ample
opportunity for abandoning the traditional value of the presumption of
innocence in favor of the radically more restrictive view forged by the
Court. While this article does not propose to be an exhaustive examination
of the current posture of the presumption of innocence at the trial stage
itself, it does serve as a background for noting that the concept of dimin-
ished presumption cannot, and is not, confined to the pretrial process.
V. CONCLUSION
Packer wrote in 1968 that the criminal process then in existence fol-
lowed "fairly closely the dictates of the Crime Control Model."115 Professor
Packer believed, however, that the path of constitutional reform would
441 U.S. 786 (1979).
112 In Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), the Court appeared to recognize
that due process required that a jury be instructed on the presumption of inno-
cence. The Court considered the trial court's failure to grant a defense request
that an instruction to the jury on the presumption of innocence be given. Id. at
485-86. Additionally, the prosecutor engaged in remarks of dubious propriety
including suggestions that the jury infer guilt from the indictment and Taylor's
status as a defendant. Id. at 486-88. The Court went on to find that the defendant
was denied fair trial because of the failure to instruct the jury on the presumption.
Id. at 490.
1441 U.S. at 789.
114 In Taylor, the Court took on the question of whether the presumption of
innocence was subsumed by the burden on the state to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Court stated, in response to the state's position that an
instruction on the presumption is not needed where an instruction on guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt is given, "even if the instruction on reasonable doubt had been
more clearly stated, the Commonwealth's argument ignores both the special pur-
pose of a presumption-of-innocence instruction and the particular need for such
an instruction in this case." 436 U.S. at 488.
115 H. PACKER, supra note 29, at 239.
19891
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
result in the firm establishment of a Due Process Model; a model char-
acterized by a "judicialization" of each stage, and an enhanced capacity
on the part of defendants to challenge and defend at each stage."
6
In the approximately twenty years that have passed since his predic-
tion, there has indeed been change, but not the change that Packer fore-
saw. Instead, what has occurred, at least in the context of the presumption
of innocence, is the reverse of Packer's proposed evolution. Like Alice
stepping through the looking glass, the current concept of the presump-
tion of innocence reflects not the time honored value of Blackstone's one
innocent man, but instead holds forth the image of unpunished crime.
Our judicial system appears now willing to sacrifice the well being of the
innocent to insure the punishment of the guilty. Our impatience with due
process as time consuming and inefficient has led to acceptance of guilt
by accusation.
It took only the smallest of cracks in our traditional concept of innocence
for the entire body of the presumption to crumble. The result has been
to cast the meaning of the presumption into doubt and uncertainty.
117
From a constitutional standpoint, the presumption of innocence has
been relegated to an evidentiary rule barely distinguishable from the
prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 8 As
116 Id.
117 While it appears clear that the diminishing of the presumption of innocence
has received constitutional sanction primarily in the period following Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), the recognition of its shadowy nature at common law
was noted in several early texts. In Ten Years a Police Judge (1884), an unknown
author stated:
The whole course of criminal procedure, from inception to close, is
designed to shut out presumptions of innocence and invite presump-
tions of guilt. The secrecy of complaintmaking at the magistrate's
office, the mysterious inquisition of the grand jury room, the publicity
of the arrest, the commitment to the lock-up, the demand of bail, the
delay of trial, the enforced silence of defence till prosecution has done
its worst, are all so many steps and strokes to blacken the accused
before he is permitted to open his mouth with a syllable of evidence
to break the force of the damaging array of circumstances. To suppose
that the presumption of innocence, which unbiassed [sic] nature
prompts, is not before this time choked and strangled to death is an
absurdity too gross to dispute.
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2511 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (quoting ANONYMOUS, TEN
YEARS A POLICE JUDGE, 207 (1884)), and C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 805-06 (2d ed.
1972).
118 In Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that a defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the presumption of
innocence "as long as the trial court instructs the jury on reasonable doubt." 436
U.S. 482, 483 (1978) (quoting State v. Taylor, 551 S.W.2d 813, 814 (1977)). The
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Kentucky Court's view, noting that scholars
such as Wigmore, McCormick, and Thayer warned against abandoning the use
of a separate instruction on the presumption of innocence because, in the words
of Wigmore:
[I]n a criminal case the term [presumption of innocence] does convey
a special and perhaps useful hint over and above the other form of
the rule about the burden of proof, in that it cautions the jury to put
away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest,
the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion
solely from the legal evidence adduced.
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1978) (quoting J. WIGMORE, supra note
117).
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such it may legitimately be asked whether there is any value in contin-
uing to pay lip service to what has essentially become an extinct notion.
Although this commentary on the fate of the presumption of innocence
has looked at only three areas - pretrial detention, forfeiture of property,
and trial setting - those three areas have formed the foundation of our
traditional notion of due process. The cards are therefore plain to read,
that a fundamental change in the notion of constitutional protection of
the presumption of innocence has been wrought. Lewis Carroll's White
Queen (presumably a sister of the Queen of Hearts) perhaps sums up the
philosophy in her dialogue with Alice:
[Tihere's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being pun-
ished: and the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and
of course the crime comes last of all.
- Lewis Carroll, Through The Looking Glass

